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NOTES AND COMMENT
ing certain modes of procedure, in federal cases, it is submitted
that there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment that forbids
a state from keeping its rules of procedure and evidence abreast
of the most enlightened views of modern jurisprudence.
C. JOSEPHa DANAHY.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE-ORAL PROOF OF CONTENTS OF WRITINGS.
It is common learning in the law of evidence that a writing or
document is the best evidence of what it contains. "Indeed the
term 'best evidence' has been described as a convenient short de-
scription of the rule as to proving the contents of a writing." I
Therefore, generally, oral testimony will not be admitted to
prove what was contained in a writing; the document itself must
be produced and offered in evidence.2 The reasons for this rule
are founded on the uncertainty of oral testimony based on recollec-
tion, and the inability to reproduce properly such characteristics as
form, handwriting and physical appearance. 3 But, like most laws
of a pseudo-science, this general rule has several exceptions, and it
is with one of these exceptions that we are concerned.
Broadly stated it may be said that when the writing is not in
issue and is merely collateral to the subject of the action, parol
evidence of its contents is admissible without otherwise accounting
for its absence.4 Expediency demands that we curtail our inquiry
from examining into every writing, no matter how remote. 5 Briefly
'Jones, Law of Evidence (3rd ed. 1924), p. 286.
'Arizona Fire Ins. Co. v. Dillingham, 23 Ariz. 508, 205 Pac. 589 (1922);
Butler v. Mail & Express Pub. Co., 171 N. Y. 208, 63 N. E. 951 (1902);
Mahaney v. Carr, 175 N. Y. 454, 67 N. E. 903 (1903); Matter-of Smith, 61
Hun 101, 151 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1891); 2 Wigmore on Evidence (1923 Sec.
1178. (The rule has been held to apply to Workmen's Compensation cases.)
Baum v. Industrial Commission, 288 Ill. 516, 123 N. E. 625, 6 A. L. R. 1243(1919). (The application of this rule should not be confused with the parol
evidence rule which is binding only on parties to the instrument but not on
third persons.) Follinsbee v. Sawyer, 157 N. Y. 196, 51 N. E. 994 (1898).(The best evidence rule applies to all who seek to use a writing whether or
not they are parties to it.) I.nfra note 33; cf. Miles v. Walker, 179 N. C.
479, 484, 102 S. E. 884, 886 (1920).
'2 Wigmore, mspra note 2, Sec. 1179.
' Coonrod v. Madden, 126 Ind. 192. 25 N. E. 1102 (1890); Gilbert v.
Duncan, 29 N. J. L. 133 (1861); Fairchild v. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471 (1876);
Grover v. Morris, 73 N. Y. 473 (1878) ; Daniels v. Smith, 130 N. Y. 696, 29 N.
E. 1098 (1892) ; Bowen v. Newport National Bank, 11 Hun 226 (N. Y., 1877) ;
Cullinan v. Furthman, 70 App. Div. 110, 75 N. Y. Supp. 90 (Ist Dept. 1902);
Thayer's Cases on Evidence (1900), p. 747; 2 Wigmore, supra note 2, Sec.
1252.
assey v. Farmer's National Bank, 113 Ill. 334, 338 (1885).
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stated as the rule is, its application is attended by much uncertainty,
and the purpose of this paper is to attempt a more definite and com-
prehensible rule which will satisfy the exigencies of trial practice.
At the outset we must note the distinction between this rule
and other rules which permit oral evidence of independent facts,
the occurrence of which has been recorded in writing.6 If an event,
happening, personal status or legal relationship has been reduced to
writing, oral testimony is still admissible to prove the event, etc.,just as it is always admitted to prove any other fact.7 In our dis-
cussion the writing is the fact 8 itself, and is, therefore, the best
evidence of what it relates. Examples of the latter are deeds,0
contracts, 10 letters 11 and the like. Again we note that the exist-
ence, 2 execution, 13 and delivery 14 of documents are all facts which
co-exist apart from the contents of the writing and may be proved
independently thereof by oral testimony. Testimony which relates
of the existence of a deed does not prove its contents. Our prob-
lem is proving the contents themselves, not any of the "collateral"
facts. Though this distinction is clear and unmistakable, judicial
opinions have not been overcareful to preserve it. Much confusion
has arisen from the indiscriminate use of the word "collateral." 15
Jones, supra note 1, Sec. 203. "If the essential fact to be proved is not
the contents of a written instrument, but an independent fact to which the
writing is merely collateral, or of which it is merely an incident, there is no
reason for the application of the rule under discussion. In such cases the
contents of the document are no part of the issue; and there is no agreement
that the writing shall be the sole repository of the fact."
Southwick v. Hayden, 7 Cowen 334 (N. Y. 1827); Steele v. Lord, 70
N. Y. 280 (1877), (receipt of money or goods); State v. McDonald, 65
Me. 466 (1876); Weinhandler v. Eastern Brewing Co., 46 Misc. 584, 92
N. Y. Supp. 792 (1905), (stenographer's minutes of testimony on former trial) ;
Commonwealth v. Dill, 156 Mass. 226, 30 N. E. 1016 (1892), (marriage);
Stubblefield v. Roper, 136 Miss. 831, 101 So. 852 (1924), (partnership if said
is between partner and third person, but contra if between partners) ; McCall
v. Moschowitz, 14 Daly, 16, 25 (N. Y. 1886), (membership in Stock Ex-
ehange) ; Gwathmey et al. v. Burgiss, 104 S. E. 816 (1916).
8Commonwealth v. Dill, supra note 7; Tice v. Reeves, 30 N. J. L. 314
(1863), (divorce) ; Carter v. Pitcher, 87 Hun 580, 34 N. Y. Supp. 549 (1895),
(deed).
9 Volhard v. Volhard. 119 App. Div. 226, 104 N. Y. Supp. 578 (1st Dept.
1907) ; Carter v. Pitcher, supra note 8.
"' Mahaney v. Carr, sifpra note 2.
'Brown v. Jewett, 18 N. H. 230 (1846).
' Wessel v. Cook, 132 Minn. 442. 157 N. W. 705 (1916); Bardin v.
Stevenson, 75 N. Y. 164, 166 (1878); Bishop v. Kelly, 7 Ab. Law Jour. 94
(N. Y. 1873); Reynolds v. Kelly, 1 Daly 283 (N. Y. 1863); 22 C. J. 986
note 4.
'Leon v. Kerridan. 47 Fla. 178, 36 So. 173 (1904); Uhl v. Moorhouse,
137 Ind. 445, 37 N. E. 366 (1893) ; Heimerdinger v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co.,
26 Misc. 374, 56 N. Y. Supp. 188 (1899); 17 Cyc. 477.
"Commonwealth v. Best, 180 Mass. 492, 62 N. E. 748 (1902); Smith v.
Bank, 45 Nebr. 444, 63 N. W. 796 (1895).
'2 Wigmore, miupra note 2, Sec. 1253.
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Its great breadth of meaning has caused it to be employed as a
catchword by Courts without regard to definite rule.
The word "collateral" has been used to describe two separate
and distinct relations. First, it is used to define the relation between
the document itself and the events which exist independent of it,
iz., execution and delivery. Secondly, it is used to describe the
relation which the contents of the writing bears to the main issues
of the case. Lexicographically its use is justified in either case,
but for clarity of judicial expression it would be better if its use
were confined only to one of these relations. We would prefer
"collateral" to be used in reference to the first class, and that some
other term such as "subordinate," or the common expression "not in
issue" 10 indicate the second; not that it is more descriptive but
merely to distinguish the two classes. However this may be we
have yet to determine just when the contents of the writing are
"not in issue," "collateral" or "subordinate."
From an analysis of many cases it might be supposed that a
clear test would be whether the evidence made out a prima facie
case or a defense.17 Such a criterion would be relatively easy of
application since the essential elements of a suit are readily ascer-
tainable. If a prima facie case cannot be made out without it, the
writing is indispensable; if the prima facie case is established
without reference to it, oral evidence is admissible. Many cases
would fall within such a rule. Thus in a case 18 of criminal prose-
cution for assault arising out of a dispute over the right to posses-
sion of land, the state showed by oral testimony that the right of
possession was in the complaining witness.
"The issue as to the ownership or right of possession
to said land was only collaterally involved. The principal
issue was: Did appellant assault Calendar with the intent to
kill him?" 19
So too when a person has been assaulted while at the house of
the defendant under a writ of detinue, the writ need not be pro-
duced since the assault, and not the writ, is the issue.20
But the application of the rule has been even broader than that.
The best evidence is not needed to prove every element of a prima
' Issue has been defined as "some question; either fact or law, disputed
between the parties, and mutually proposed and accepted by them as the sub-ject for decision." Riggs v. Chatin, 7 N. Y. Supp. 765 (1889); Hays v.
Hays, 23 Wend. 363, 370 (N. Y. 1840).
" The only case which suggests this test in so many words is Richardson
v. Chas. A. Jones, etc., infra note 25.
State v. Goodrich, 24 N. Mex. 176, 176 Pac. 813 (1918); see also Wood-
ward Iron Co. v. Collins, 200 Ala. 553, 76 So. 911 (1917).
"' State v. Goodrich. supra note 18 at 179; 176 Pac. at 814.
'Griffin v. State, 129 Ala. 92, 29 So. 783 (1901).
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facie case. It has been held 21 that the plaintiff may prove the ex-
tent of his damages by oral proof of writings. In an action for
slander to plaintiff's title to real property it was held error to ex-
clude oral testimony of a contract which plaintiff claims to have
made for the sale of the property. 22
"This false representation is what the plaintiff complains
of. This is the gravamen, the grievance (cit.). The sale
to Isbell * * * is collateral to the gravamen, the issue in ac-
tion; and is only material as to the measure of damage to
which plaintiff would be entitled if he sustains the issue as
to the slander * * *." 22a
Apparently then the issue which determines the admissibility
of the evidence is the briefest possible statement of the single point
litigated. Thus when a plaintiff sued for a death benefit, and re-
lied on an absence of seven years to establish the death of the insured,
though it was necessary for her to prove that she made a diligent
search for the deceased, oral evidence was sufficient to show the
publication of notices in the paper.2 3  The issue was the death of
the insured, not whether plaintiff had made sufficient inquiry, though
it was necessary to prove the search.
All testimony which generally supports or explains a case or
defense is admissible. Oral evidence has been held to be admissible
to prove a person's ability to pay,24 to show origin of title,25 to
contradict or impeach a witness,26 to prove method of payment,27
to explain other evidence, 28 or to show a motive for one's acts.
29
While proof of these facts gives vitality and sustenance to a case,
it is quite plain that they are not the basis of the suit, in which case
it is unanimously held that if the writing is the foundation of the
action, it must be produced.30 Though this is true, it is often stated
' Forest Preserves of Cook County v. Kean, 298 Ill. 37, 131 N. E. 117
(1921); Tallahatchie Lumber Co. v. Cecil Lumber Co., 124 Miss. 897, 87
So. 449 (1921); Carden v. McConnell, 116 N. C. 875, 21 S. E. 923 (1895).
Carden v. McConnell, ibid.
22a Ibid. at 877, 21 S. E. at 924.
' Wehring v. Modern Woodmen of America, 107 Minn. 25, 119 N. W.
245 (1909).
'Hazel v. Dougherty, 207 Ky. 89, 268 S. W. 823 (1925) ; Oakes v. West,
64 S. W. 1033 (Texas Civ. Ct. of App. 1901).
'
1Richardson v. Chas A. Jones Flour & Grain Co., 212 Ala. 492, 103 So.
463 (1925).
' Kershaw Mining Co. v. Lankford. 213 Ala. 630, 105 So. 896 (1925).
'Little v. Peoples Bank of Mobile, 209 Ala. 620. 96 So. 763 (1923);
Eyre v. Coal & Iron-National Bank of City of N. Y., 208 App. Div. 686,
204 N. Y. Supp. (1st Dept. 1924).
' Share v. Coats, 29 S. Dak. 603, 137 N. W. 402 (1912); Massey v. Bank,
supra note 5.5 Dillinger v. Lee, 158 Ark. 374. 250 S. W. 332 (1923); De Bardeleben v.
Sellers, 17 Ala. App. 247, 84 So. 403 (1919).
' Supra note 2.
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that, as a logical deduction from this premise, if the writing is not
the foundation of the suit, it need not be produced.31 Many cases
which have admitted oral proof of documents have assigned this as
the reason in other cases of which Taft v. Little 32 is an example,
wherein parol proof of a contract was excluded and the suit was
not based on the writing. In this case a subcontractor sued the
owner of the house for work done, claiming that it was "extra
work," and not included in the contract, and it was held error to
permit the plaintiff to give oral proof that the work was not covered
by the contract, the latter being held to be the best evidence of what
it did or did not contain. It is evident then that the fact that a
suit is not based on a writing is no criterion of its admissibility.33
No rule of law will reconcile all of the cases. An example of
one with whose conclusion we cannot agree was an action for in-
junction to compel the defendant to remove a barrier in the road-
way, a public highway.34
"It was necessary for plaintiff to show that they had
an interest in the road different from that of the public
generally in order to maintain the action."
Yet here plaintiff was permitted to testify orally that he owned
lands reached by the road. If the ownership of the land was not
the actual basis of the suit, at least it was so much a part of it as
to have required the application of the best evidence rule. But
it is cases like this which illustrate the judicial temper in reviewing
an appeal based on admission of oral evidence of writings. The
policy of the courts seems to be to admit as much as possible with-
out a flagrant abuse of discretion by the trial justice.
In summary we can only vaguely suggest the limits of the rule.
When the cause of action or the defense interposed is found in the
writing or based on it, or when it is direct proof of a vital element
of a substantive right, its production is necessary. But when its
office is to support or sustain other proof, or make it more intel-
ligible or in any way add or detract from the weight of other evi-
dence or to prove directly other facts which are themselves cumula-
tive evidence, production of the writing will be dispensed with.
And, we feel that no statement of the law should confine the free
use of the discretion of the trial judge. "The urge of a new
group of facts, a new combination of events "bring forth some" un-
suspected equity" 35 which demands the experienced discrimination
of the judge.
TH oMAs M. McDAi)E.
Hazel v. Dougherty, supra note 24; Share v. Coats, supra note 28; Grover
v. Morris, 73, N. Y. 473. 480 (1878); 17 Cyc. 469.
178 N. Y. 127, 70 N. E. 211 (1904) ; (1904) 18 Harv. L. Rev. 560.
'Woolley, Oral Proof of Contents of Writings, (1907 9 Bench & Bar
88, 93.
' Shanks v. Robertson, 101 Kan. 463, 168 Pac. 316, 1 A. L. R. 1140(1917).
' Cardozo, The Growth of the Lawv, (1927) p. 67.
